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Title: Robin Hood's Compromise: Land Reforms, Inequality, Redistribution and Moral Hazard

Author(s): Oriana Bandiera and Gilat Levy

Publication Date: June 2004

Keyword(s): inequality, land reforms, moral hazard and redistribution

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers? welfare. Compared to the classic redistribution ?to the tiller? it does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a collaterizable asset but it is likely to be more sustainable, both economically and politically.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bandiera, O and Levy, G. 2004. 'Robin Hood's Compromise: Land Reforms, Inequality, Redistribution and Moral Hazard'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4410