Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP4469 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Productivity Improvements in Public Organizations

Author(s): Hans Gersbach and Marten Keil

Publication Date: July 2004

Keyword(s): collusion, incentive schemes, public organizations and tournament and rotation schemes

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: In this Paper we examine the possibilities a principal in a public organization has to motivate agents for productivity improvements where standard stick and carrot incentives cannot be used. The principal?s only incentive device is a reallocation of budgets and tasks across agents depending on the extent of productivity improvements revealed by each agent. We first show that as long as agents do not collude, the principal can use rotation and tournament schemes to eliminate all slack in the organization. Second, to break collusion between agents, the principal must use discriminatory tournament schemes. In some cases, however, there does not exist an incentive scheme to overcome collusion.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4469

Bibliographic Reference

Gersbach, H and Keil, M. 2004. 'Productivity Improvements in Public Organizations'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4469