Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP4511 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Performance Pay and Adverse Selection

Author(s): Espen R Moen and Åsa Rosén

Publication Date: August 2004

Keyword(s): efficiency, performance pay and selection

Programme Area(s): Labour Economics

Abstract: It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyse an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the gains to the firms from worker self-selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive to workers to exert too much effort.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4511

Bibliographic Reference

Moen, E and Rosén, Å. 2004. 'Performance Pay and Adverse Selection'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4511