Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?

Author(s): Pedro Pita Barros and Steffen Hoernig

Publication Date: August 2004

Keyword(s): competition authority, institutional relationship, lobbying, sectoral regulators and strategic substitutes and complements

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Inspired by the creation of the new Competition Authority in Portugal, we consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies; for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. We analyse how authorities? incentives are affected if they can decide independently, or must follow each others? opinions, respectively, and consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. It is found that the best results tend to be achieved when the authorities act independently of each other: the probability of coming to a decision is higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying.

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Bibliographic Reference

Barros, P and Hoernig, S. 2004. 'Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4541