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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents

Author(s): Timothy J. Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak

Publication Date: September 2004

Keyword(s): competition, incentives and non-profits

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private non-profits is the importance of missions, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This Paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching principals? and agents? mission preferences in increasing organizational efficiency and reducing the need for high-powered incentives. The framework developed in this Paper is applied to non-profits, school competition, and incentives in the public sector.

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Bibliographic Reference

Besley, T and Ghatak, M. 2004. 'Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4641