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Title: Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships

Author(s): Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

Publication Date: December 2004

Keyword(s): dictatorship, formal political theory and principal agent

Programme Area(s): Institutions and Economic Performance

Abstract: The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most dictators throughout history. Better informed viziers are also better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the dictator. To avoid this, dictators ? especially those which are weak and vulnerable ? sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. One reason why democracies generally witness more talented people in the government is the dictator?s inability to commit to the optimal (less than the capital) punishment for those who unsuccessfully plotted to remove him from power. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a dictator is limited by the fact that rewards are conditional on dictator?s own willingness to keep his promises, while punishments are conditional on dictator?s own survival. We model a principal-agent game between a dictator and his (probably, few) viziers both in static and dynamic perspectives. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem the insecure dictators face.

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Bibliographic Reference

Egorov, G and Sonin, K. 2004. 'Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4777