Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP5095 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Lending Booms and Lending Standards

Author(s): Giovanni DellAriccia and Robert Marquez

Publication Date: June 2005

Keyword(s): asymmetric information, banking competition and lending standards

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: This paper examines how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks? strategic behaviour in determining lending standards, lending volumes, and the aggregate allocation of credit. In a setting where banks obtain private information about their clients? creditworthiness, we show that banks may loosen lending standards when information asymmetries vis vis other banks are low. In equilibrium this reduction in standards leads to a deterioration of banks? portfolios, a reduction in their profits, and an aggregate credit expansion. Furthermore, we show that although these low standards may increase aggregate surplus, they also increase the risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises that have occurred in many emerging markets.

For full details and related downloads, please visit:

Bibliographic Reference

DellAriccia, G and Marquez, R. 2005. 'Lending Booms and Lending Standards'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.