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Title: Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

Author(s): Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn

Publication Date: July 2005

Keyword(s): central banks and transparency voting

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: We examine whether the central bank council of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare if the private benefits of holding office are sufficiently low. High private benefits of central bankers lower overall welfare under opacity, as they induce European central bankers to care more about being re-appointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. We show that opacity and low private benefits jointly guarantee the optimal welfare level. Moreover, we suggest that non-renewable terms for national central bankers and delegating the appointment of all council members to a European agency would be desirable.

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Bibliographic Reference

Gersbach, H and Hahn, V. 2005. 'Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5155