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Title: Screening Disability Insurance Applications

Author(s): Philip de Jong, Maarten Lindeboom and Bas van der Klaauw

Publication Date: March 2006

Keyword(s): disability insurance, policy evaluation, self-screening and sickness absenteeism

Programme Area(s): Labour Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

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Bibliographic Reference

de Jong, P, Lindeboom, M and van der Klaauw, B. 2006. 'Screening Disability Insurance Applications'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5564