Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP5712 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions

Author(s): Raymond Fisman and Roberta Gatti

Publication Date: June 2006


Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We develop a simple bargaining framework of corruption where firms pay bribes to avoid regulation. Consistent with this setup, we find that time spent bargaining with bureaucrats and amount of bribe payments are positively correlated, but that this association is weaker (and, thus, corruption more 'efficient') when the terms of unofficial contracts are known to the firms. We also show that institutional arrangements that result in lower uncertainty in bargaining for bribes attenuate the impact of corruption on firm growth.

For full details and related downloads, please visit:

Bibliographic Reference

Fisman, R and Gatti, R. 2006. 'Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.