Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP5802 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
Title: When Does Coordination Require Centralization?
Author(s): Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek
Publication Date: August 2006
Keyword(s): cheap talk, coordination, decision rights and incomplete contracts
Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization
Abstract: This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multi-divisional organization in which decisions must be responsive to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self-interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk. The only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights. We show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication. As a result, no matter how important coordination is, decentralization dominates centralization if the division managers are not too biased towards their own divisions and the divisions are not too different from each other (e.g. in terms of division size).
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Alonso, R, Dessein, W and Matouschek, N. 2006. 'When Does Coordination Require Centralization?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5802