Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Author(s): Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication Date: March 2007

Keyword(s): Innovation, Licences, Monopoly and Private information

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There are situations in which more licenses are sold if effort is a hidden action. Moral hazard may thus increase the probability that the product will be developed.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6207

Bibliographic Reference

Schmitz, P. 2007. 'Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6207