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Title: Legislative Process with Open Rules

Author(s): Theresa Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach

Publication Date: April 2007

Keyword(s): bargaining in legislatures, Baron/Ferejohn model, open rules and three-group and four-group equilibria

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.

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Bibliographic Reference

Fahrenberger, T and Gersbach, H. 2007. 'Legislative Process with Open Rules'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6240