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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Author(s): Kai A. Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger

Publication Date: June 2007

Keyword(s): collective action, defence, distributional conflict, free-riding, norms and war

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.

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Bibliographic Reference

Konrad, K and Leininger, W. 2007. 'Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6333