Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Full Details

Title: Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Author(s): Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Publication Date: June 2007

Keyword(s): Amnesty, Antitrust, Cartels, CEO compensation, Collusion, Corporate crime, Corporate fraud, Corporate governance, Corporate liability, Corruption, Deterrence, Employee liability, Fines, Immunity, Imprisonment, Indemnification, Judgement proofness, Leniency, Managerial incentives, Optimal sanctions, Rewards and Whistleblowers

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics and Industrial Organization

Abstract: This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.

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Bibliographic Reference

Buccirossi, P and Spagnolo, G. 2007. 'Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6349