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Title: Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard

Author(s): Tymofiy Mylovanov and Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication Date: September 2007

Keyword(s): hidden actions, Job design, limited liability and task assignment

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the optimal schedule of tasks over time and the optimal assignment of tasks to agents conditional on the outcomes of previous tasks. In particular, we show that delaying tasks is optimal if and only if the effect of an agent's effort on the probability of success is relatively low.

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Bibliographic Reference

Mylovanov, T and Schmitz, P. 2007. 'Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6467