Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP6498 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets

Author(s): Fernando A Broner, Alberto Martín and Jaume Ventura

Publication Date: September 2007

Keyword(s): default, enforcement, secondary markets, sovereign risk and weak law enforcement

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6498

Bibliographic Reference

Broner, F, Martín, A and Ventura, J. 2007. 'Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6498