Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP6677 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees

Author(s): Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn

Publication Date: February 2008

Keyword(s): career concerns, committees, experts, information acquisition and transparency

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We study a two-period model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal's initial utility is higher under transparency, because members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general, committee members are harmed by transparency.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6677

Bibliographic Reference

Gersbach, H and Hahn, V. 2008. 'Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6677