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Title: Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Author(s): Paola Conconi, Giovanni Facchini and Maurizio Zanardi

Publication Date: April 2008

Keyword(s): Fast Track Authority, Strategic Delegation and Trade Negotiations

Programme Area(s): International Trade and Regional Economics

Abstract: Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators? FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

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Bibliographic Reference

Conconi, P, Facchini, G and Zanardi, M. 2008. 'Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6790