Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders

Author(s): Mattias Ganslandt, Lars Persson and Helder Vasconcelos

Publication Date: May 2008

Keyword(s): Cartels, Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, Merger Policy and Ring Leader

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Many convicted cartels have a leader which is substantially larger than its rivals. In a setting where firms face indivisible costs of collusion, we show that: (i) firms may have an incentive to merge so as to create asymmetric market structures since this enables the merged firm to cover the indivisible cost associated with cartel leadership; and (ii) forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion. Thus, these results have implications for the practice of the current EU and US merger policies.

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Bibliographic Reference

Ganslandt, M, Persson, L and Vasconcelos, H. 2008. 'Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.