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Title: Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Author(s): Klaus M. Schmidt

Publication Date: October 2008

Keyword(s): complementary patents, IP rights, licensing, patent pool, standards and vertical integration

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation.

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Bibliographic Reference

Schmidt, K. 2008. 'Complementary Patents and Market Structure'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7005