Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction

Author(s): Achim Wambach

Publication Date: October 2008

Keyword(s): Descending auction, Dutch auction, First price sealed bid auction and Information acquisition

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.

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Bibliographic Reference

Wambach, A. 2008. 'Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7023