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Title: Dynamic Merger Review

Author(s): Volker Nocke and Michael Whinston

Publication Date: December 2008

Keyword(s): efficiency gain, horizontal merger, market power, merger policy and oligopoly

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.

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Bibliographic Reference

Nocke, V and Whinston, M. 2008. 'Dynamic Merger Review'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7077