Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP7280 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
Title: Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?
Author(s): Giovanni Immordino, Marco Pagano and Michele Polo
Publication Date: April 2009
Keyword(s): authorization, deterrence, innovation, liability for harm and safety regulation
Programme Area(s): Public Economics
Abstract: We analyze optimal policy design when firms' research activity may lead to socially harmful innovations. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research (average deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put (marginal deterrence). We show that public intervention should become increasingly stringent as the probability of social harm increases, switching first from laissez-faire to a penalty regime, then to a lenient authorization regime, and finally to a strict one. In contrast, absent innovative activity, regulation should rely only on authorizations, and laissez-faire is never optimal. Therefore, in innovative industries regulation should be softer.
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Immordino, G, Pagano, M and Polo, M. 2009. 'Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7280