Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Full Details

Title: The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Author(s): Eva I Hoppe-Fischer and Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication Date: June 2009

Keyword(s): adverse selection, Hidden information and information gathering

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7331

Bibliographic Reference

Hoppe-Fischer, E and Schmitz, P. 2009. 'The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7331