Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP7487 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Author(s): Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer

Publication Date: October 2009

Keyword(s): combinatorial auction, core, core-selecting auction, multi-object auction, package auction, robust design, simultaneous ascending auction, Vickrey and Vickrey auction

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and Public Economics

Abstract: We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules," to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7487

Bibliographic Reference

Erdil, A and Klemperer, P. 2009. 'A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7487