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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games

Author(s): Juan J. Dolado, Mark Griffiths and Atilano Jorge Padilla

Publication Date: February 1993

Keyword(s): Delegation, International Economy, Monetary Policy and Spillovers

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: In this paper we show that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in an international context with monetary spillovers between countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to incorporate the coordination of monetary policies.

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Bibliographic Reference

Dolado, J, Griffiths, M and Padilla, A. 1993. 'Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=761