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Title: Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

Author(s): Winand Emons

Publication Date: January 2010

Keyword(s): credence goods, demand inducement, expert services, incentives, insurance and medical doctors

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments since other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes do not provide proper incentives. If insurers use, however, fee-for-service schemes with quantity restrictions, they solve the fraudulent physician problem.

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Bibliographic Reference

Emons, W. 2010. 'Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7659