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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals

Author(s): Basak Akbel and Monika Schnitzer

Publication Date: August 2010

Keyword(s): capital structure, coinsurance, creditor rights, internal capital markets and Multinational corporations

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and International Trade and Regional Economics

Abstract: We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building tendencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.

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Bibliographic Reference

Akbel, B and Schnitzer, M. 2010. 'Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7958