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Title: Who Should Pay for Certification?

Author(s): Konrad O Stahl and Roland Strausz

Publication Date: January 2011

Keyword(s): asymmetric information, certification, information acquisition, inspection, lemons, middlemen and signaling

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer --- the seller --- follows from a non--trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer--induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence seller--induced certification acts as a signalling device. Seller--induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets -- in particular the financial market.

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Bibliographic Reference

Stahl, K and Strausz, R. 2011. 'Who Should Pay for Certification?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8190