Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Author(s): Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication Date: July 2012

Keyword(s): asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, investment incentives and public goods

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9065

Bibliographic Reference

Schmitz, P. 2012. 'Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9065