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Discussion Paper Details

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Full Details

Title: Loan Sales and Screening Incentives

Author(s): Helmut Bester, Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka

Publication Date: September 2012

Keyword(s): loan sales, screening and securitization

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: We analyze the effect of loan sales on the intensity of costly screening. Loan sales strengthen screening incentives when screening primarily improves the bank?s ability to identify profitable loans and when banks retain most of those profitable loans. However, loan sales dampen screening incentives when the benefit of screening primarily helps to weed out unprofitable projects. Moreover, alternative institutions of information production and the institutional market framework affect the relative benefits and costs of loan sales, and screening respectively. Accordingly, the potential regulation of loan sales has to take into account the whole impact on societal information production, both in markets and non-market institutions.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bester, H, Gehrig, T and Stenbacka, R. 2012. 'Loan Sales and Screening Incentives'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9084