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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing

Author(s): Yrjö Koskinen and Jøril Mæland

Publication Date: October 2012

Keyword(s): Agency costs, Auctions, Innovation, Investment timing and Real options

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics and Industrial Organization

Abstract: In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts have to be compensated for, but competition helps to erode innovators' informational rents, since innovators are more likely to lose the competition if they inflate investment costs. Consequently, competition leads to faster innovation, because the investor has less of a need to delay expensive investments. The investor's payoff sensitivity also increases with competition, thus enabling the investor to capture more of the upside of innovative activity.

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Bibliographic Reference

Koskinen, Y and Mæland, J. 2012. 'Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9187