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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?

Author(s): Erlend Berg, Maitreesh Ghatak, R Manjula, D Rajasekhar and Sanchari Roy

Publication Date: May 2013

Keyword(s): incentive pay, information constraints, knowledge transmission, public services and social proximity

Programme Area(s): Development Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to flat pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.

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Bibliographic Reference

Berg, E, Ghatak, M, Manjula, R, Rajasekhar, D and Roy, S. 2013. 'Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9477