DP103 Counterfeit Product Trade
Author(s): | Gene M. Grossman |
Publication Date: | April 1986 |
Keyword(s): | Counterfeiting, Reputation, Trademarks |
JEL(s): | 026, 411, 422 |
Programme Areas: | International Trade and Regional Economics |
Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=103 |
We analyze a two-country model of trade in both legitimate and counterfeit products. Domestic firms own trademarks and establish reputations for delivering high-quality products in a steady-state equilibrium. Foreign suppliers export legitimate low-quality merchandise and counterfeits of domestic brand-name goods. Heterogeneous home consumers either purchase low-quality imports or buy brand-name products, rationally expecting some degree of counterfeiting of the latter. We characterize a counterfeiting equilibrium and explore its properties. We describe the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting in comparison with a no-counterfeiting benchmark. Finally, we provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy and of policy regarding the disposition of counterfeit goods that are confiscated at the border.