DP10438 The quality-assuring role of mutual fund advisory fees
|Author(s):||Michel Antoine Habib, D. Bruce Johnsen|
|Publication Date:||February 2015|
|Keyword(s):||advisory fees, closet indexing, excessive fees, open-access, quality-assurance|
|JEL(s):||D23, D86, G23, L22|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10438|
Active fund managers implicitly promise to research profitable portfolio selection. But active management is an experience good subject to moral hazard. Investors cannot tell high from low quality up front and therefore fear manager shirking. We show how the parties mitigate the moral hazard by paying the manager a premium fee sufficiently high that the manager's one-time gain from shirking is less than the capitalized value of the premium stream he earns from maintaining his promise to provide high quality. Premium advisory fees act as a quality-assuring bond. Our model has a number of revealing extensions and comparative statics.