DP10519 Coordination and the fight against tax havens
|Author(s):||Kai A. Konrad, Tim Stolper|
|Publication Date:||March 2015|
|Keyword(s):||initiatives against harmful tax practices, tax evasion, tax havens|
|JEL(s):||G20, H26, H87|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10519|
The success or failure of the fight against tax havens is the outcome of a coordination game between a tax haven and its potential investors. Key determinants are the costly international pressure and the haven country's revenue pool. The latter is determined endogenously by the decisions of many individual investors. Our findings explain why some havens attract large sources of international investment and earn large revenues while other countries do not, and why their profits are not competed away. We identify a trade-off between fighting tax havens and high tax rates or, similarly, small fines for disclosed tax evasion.