DP10959 Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence
|Author(s):||Joseph A. Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee, Jo Seldeslachts|
|Publication Date:||November 2015|
|Keyword(s):||competition policy, deterrence, European Commission, merger policy|
|JEL(s):||K21, K40, L40|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10959|
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as ? unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions ? phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.