DP11087 Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory

Author(s):	Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Frédéric Malherbe
Publication Date:	January 2016
Keyword(s):	constructive abstention, framing, information aggregation, laboratory experiments, unanimity rule, veto power
JEL(s):	C92, D70
Programme Areas:	Public Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11087

We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.