DP11087 Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory
|Author(s):||Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Frédéric Malherbe|
|Publication Date:||January 2016|
|Keyword(s):||constructive abstention, framing, information aggregation, laboratory experiments, unanimity rule, veto power|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11087|
We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.