DP11470 Busted! Now What? Effects of Cartel Enforcement on Firm Value and Corporate Policies
|Author(s):||Alminas ?aldokas, Ailin Dong, Massimo Massa|
|Publication Date:||August 2016|
|Keyword(s):||cartels, Collusion, firm boundaries, leniency laws, M&A|
|JEL(s):||D22, D43, G34, G38|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11470|
In a cross-country study we look at the staggered passage of national leniency laws over 1990-2012. We show that these laws lead to more convictions of cartels, and generally increase the costs of collusion by reducing the average gross margins of the affected firms. We further examine how changing costs of collusion shape firm boundaries and show that firms reorganize their activities by engaging in more horizontal acquisitions, both in the roles as the acquirer and the target. These acquisitions tend to be associated with higher announcement returns. We find little evidence of the increase in strategic alliances or greenfield investments.