DP11470 Busted! Now What? Effects of Cartel Enforcement on Firm Value and Corporate Policies

Author(s): Alminas ?aldokas, Ailin Dong, Massimo Massa
Publication Date: August 2016
Keyword(s): cartels, Collusion, firm boundaries, leniency laws, M&A
JEL(s): D22, D43, G34, G38
Programme Areas: Financial Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11470

In a cross-country study we look at the staggered passage of national leniency laws over 1990-2012. We show that these laws lead to more convictions of cartels, and generally increase the costs of collusion by reducing the average gross margins of the affected firms. We further examine how changing costs of collusion shape firm boundaries and show that firms reorganize their activities by engaging in more horizontal acquisitions, both in the roles as the acquirer and the target. These acquisitions tend to be associated with higher announcement returns. We find little evidence of the increase in strategic alliances or greenfield investments.