DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Author(s): Zakharov Alexei, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber
Publication Date: September 2016
Keyword(s): Candidates, Distribution of Ideal Points, Electoral equilibrium, Electoral Game, Rank Objectives, Valence
JEL(s): C72, D72
Programme Areas: Public Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11527

In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.