DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
|Author(s):||Zakharov Alexei, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber|
|Publication Date:||September 2016|
|Keyword(s):||Candidates, Distribution of Ideal Points, Electoral equilibrium, Electoral Game, Rank Objectives, Valence|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11527|
In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.