Discussion paper

DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous
spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential
entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in
the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently
wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in
which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence
shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter,
while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.

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Citation

Weber, S and A Shapoval (2016), ‘DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 11527. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp11527