Discussion paper

DP11867 Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and
equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective
unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persua-
sion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a
literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice
of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We
emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the
analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

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Citation

Bergemann, D and S Morris (2017), ‘DP11867 Information Design: A Unified Perspective‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 11867. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp11867