DP12174 Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
|Author(s):||Patrick W. Schmitz|
|Publication Date:||July 2017|
|Keyword(s):||Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, private information, Property rights, relationship specificity|
|JEL(s):||D23, D82, D86, L23, L24|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12174|
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We study the case of completely relationship-specific investments (i.e., the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments). It turns out that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus. Specifically, giving ownership to party B can be optimal, even when only party A has to make an investment decision and even when the owner's expected disagreement payoff is larger under A-ownership.