DP12241 Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?
| Author(s): | Marcus Ibert, Ron Kaniel, Stijn van Nieuwerburgh, Roine Vestman |
| Publication Date: | August 2017 |
| Keyword(s): | financial sector income, mutual fund performance, Portfolio manager compensation |
| JEL(s): | G00, G23, J24, J31, J33, J44 |
| Programme Areas: | Labour Economics, Financial Economics |
| Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12241 |
Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level fixed effects, revenues, and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation.