DP12305 The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives
|Author(s):||Alex Edmans, Vivian Fang, Allen Huang|
|Publication Date:||September 2017|
|Keyword(s):||CEO Incentives, M&A, Managerial Myopia, Repurchases, Short-termism, Vesting|
|JEL(s):||G12, G14, G32, G34, G35, M12, M52|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12305|
This paper shows that short-term stock price concerns induce CEOs to take value-reducing actions. Vesting equity, our measure of short-term concerns, is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger and acquisition (M&A). When vesting equity increases, stock returns are more positive in the two quarters surrounding both repurchases and M&A, but more negative in the two years following repurchases and four years following M&A. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stocks or companies to maximize long-run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short-term stock price and improve the conditions for equity sales. Overall, by identifying actions that carry clear value implications, this paper documents the long-term negative consequences of short-term incentives.