DP12503 Deadlock on the Board
|Author(s):||Jason Roderick Donaldson, Nadya Malenko, Giorgia Piacentino|
|Publication Date:||December 2017|
|Keyword(s):||CEO turnover, Corporate Boards, deadlock, director elections, entrenchment|
|JEL(s):||G34, M12, M14|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12503|
We develop a dynamic model of board decision making. We show that directors may knowingly retain the policy they all think is the worst just because they fear they may disagree about what policy is best in the future-the fear of deadlock begets deadlock. Board diversity can exacerbate deadlock. Hence, shareholders may optimally appoint a biased director to avoid deadlock. On the other hand, the CEO may appoint unbiased directors, or even directors biased against him, to create deadlock and thereby entrench himself. Still, shareholders may optimally give the CEO some power to appoint directors. Our theory thus gives a new explanation for CEO entrenchment. It also gives a new perspective on director tenure, staggered boards, and short-termism.