DP12575 Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability
|Author(s):||Dana Foarta, Jessica Leight, Rohini Pande, Laura Ralston|
|Publication Date:||January 2018|
|Programme Areas:||Development Economics|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12575|
Community targeting of vote payments - defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections - is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion.