DP12708 Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture
|Author(s):||Francesco Nava, Pasquale Schiraldi|
|Publication Date:||February 2018|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12708|
The paper analyzes a durable good monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be produced and sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, that profits exceed static optimal market-clearing profits, and that profits converge to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria when prices can be revised instantaneously. In contrast to the one-variety case though, equilibrium pricing is neither efficient nor minimal (that is, equal to the maximum between marginal cost an the minimal value). Conclusions apply even when products can be scrapped albeit at possibly smaller mark-ups. If so, a novel motive for selling high cost products naturally emerges. Moreover, with positive marginal costs, cross-subsidization arises as a result of equilibrium pricing. The online appendix delivers insights on product design.