DP1288 A Voting Power Analysis of Supranational and National Influence in the EU

Author(s): Mika Widgrén
Publication Date: January 1996
Keyword(s): Cooperative Game Theory, European Union, Voting Power
JEL(s): C71, D70
Programme Areas: International Trade and Regional Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1288

The paper deals with aspects of national and supranational influence in the European Union. The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, it deals with the relationship between the Council and Commission by applying the standard measures of voting power of cooperative games. It then extends the voting game of 15 countries in the Council of Ministers to a voting game of 16 actors: the Commission plus 15 member states. This is done by taking into account that a Commission proposal is always required for the Council to take a decision. Second, the paper analyses the impact of alternative rules and compares the problems they have with the current rule. Third, the paper investigates how these problems could be avoided.