DP13270 Incentives for Information Provision: Energy Efficiency in the Spanish Rental Market
|Author(s):||Xueying Bian, Natalia Fabra|
|Publication Date:||October 2018|
|Date Revised:||November 2018|
|Keyword(s):||adoption rate, asymmetric information, energy efficiency, rental market|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13270|
We build a search model with asymmetric information regarding housesÂ´ energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners` incentives to obtain and disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as has been widely documented - but also on the rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs. The theoretical predictions are empirically quantified in the context of the Spanish rental market.